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Abstract—Smartphone-based electronic contact tracing is cur-
rently considered an essential tool towards easing lockdowns,
curfews, and shelter-in-place orders issued by most governments
around the world in response to the 2020 novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV-2) crisis. While the focus on developing smartphone-
based contact tracing applications or apps has been on privacy
concerns stemming from the use of such apps, an important
question that has not received sufficient attention is: How reliable
will such smartphone-based electronic contact tracing be?
This is a technical question related to how two smartphones
reliably register their mutual proximity. Here, we examine in de-
tail the technical prerequisites required for effective smartphone-
based contact tracing. The underlying mechanism that any con-
tact tracing app relies on is called Neighbor Discovery (ND), which
involves smartphones transmitting and scanning for Bluetooth
signals to record their mutual presence whenever they are in
close proximity. The hardware support and the software protocols
used for ND in smartphones, however, were not designed for
reliable contact tracing. In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate
how reliably can smartphones do contact tracing. We show that
irrespective of how well a contact tracing app is designed, because
of the limitations stemming from how ND mechanisms are
implemented on currently-available phones, they cannot achieve
gapless contact tracing. Our results point towards the design
of a wearable solution for contact tracing that can overcome
the shortcomings of a smartphone-based solution to provide
more reliable and accurate contact tracing. Combining efficacious
contact tracing strategies with the available epidemic spread
models, will ultimately lead to more accurate estimates on the
adoption rates of contact tracing devices that are necessary for
containing contagion spread. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study that quantifies, both, the suitability and also the
drawbacks of smartphone-based contact tracing. Further, our
results can be used to parameterize a ND protocol to maximize
the reliability of any contact tracing app that uses it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background: The global surge of the novel coronavirus
SARS-CoV-2 in 2020 has led to a partial, and at some
places even a complete lockdown across the world. Since
every infected person can potentially cause multiple secondary
infections, the solution adopted is to limit social contacts by
enforcing social distancing and stay-at-home regimes. This has
led to severe economic and other challenges. A promising
solution being considered to enable the gradual easing of
lockdowns is wireless contact tracing using smartphones. If
all relevant previous contacts of a person tested positive for
the virus are quickly and reliably identified and isolated, then
any further spread of the infection will be reduced.
When modeling the spread of infections in a pandemic,
every infected person is considered to infect R others, where
R is referred to as the effective reproduction rate. Recent
studies, e.g., [5], suggest that the value of R can be reduced
using electronic contact tracing. The extent of this reduction
depends on the probability of detecting every individual
contact of an infected person. This probability is composed
of two factors. The first is the fraction of the population that
uses a smartphone-based contact tracing application or app,
i.e., its adoption rate. The second factor is determined by the
probability with which a smartphone is able to reliably detect
a contact. While a lot of current discussion has as focused on
the potential adoption rates of various contact tracing apps, it
has been implicitly assumed that whenever a smartphone is
used, it reliably registers all relevant contacts. The validity of
this reliability assumption has however not been studied so
far, and is the focus of this paper.
Neighbor Discovery – The Contact Tracing Basis: Detecting
contacts could potentially be done based on location services,
such as the global positioning system (GPS). However, besides
privacy issues, GPS data is very inaccurate or entirely un-
available inside buildings and therefore of limited use. Hence,
devices in vicinity are detected using short-range wireless
signals. The mechanism that lies at the heart of a smartphone
detecting the existence of another smartphone in its vicinity
is called neighbor discovery (ND). It is based on the phones
emitting and scanning for Bluetooth signals, and a successful
reception of an emitted Bluetooth signal by another phone and
vice-versa will lead to their mutual discovery. Any contact
tracing app will have to rely on this ND service provided
by a smartphone. Because both signal emission as well as
reception costs energy, and phones are battery powered, the
exact patterns of signal emission and reception are governed
by a ND protocol that attempts to balance the discovery latency
and the energy expenditure. Hence, both, the specific neighbor
discovery protocol and the manner in which it is parameter-
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ized determine the discovery latency, i.e., how quickly two
smartphones will be able to “discover” each other when they
come in close contact. The protocol and its parameterization
also determine its energy consumption, and thereby how long
a smartphone’s battery will last. Other properties, such as the
reliability of operation when a large number of phones are in
range of reception, are also determined by this.
The original Bluetooth BR/EDR protocol, which existed
before Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) was released, was
primarily designed for “pairing” the phones with other
devices like keyboards, computers or Bluetooth speakers for
the purpose of data communication. This pairing process is
not very time-sensitive, and was not designed for reliable
and sustained contact tracing, as currently envisioned against
COVID-19. In any traditional pairing process, if the pairing is
not successful then the user resets one or both the devices and
attempts again, and repeats the process until the two devices
are successfully paired for communication. However, this
manual intervention and checking whether a pairing has been
successful is not feasible in the case of contact tracing, where
two or more phones are always expected to reliably “pair”
on their own whenever they are in close proximity even for
relatively short amounts of time. In contrast, the BLE protocol
has been explicitly designed for continuously scanning in the
background and is therefore the primary choice for neighbor
discovery (ND) on smartphones. However, not all capabilities
and degrees of freedom BLE offers for ND are available on
a phone. In addition, apps commonly use BLE in the fashion
of Bluetooth BR/EDR, where scanning for other devices is
triggered manually.
Limitations of Smartphones: Hence, when a smartphone
is used for contact tracing, a relevant question is: whenever
two or more people come in contact with each other, what
is the probability of their respective smartphones being able
to record such a contact? If the duration of the contact is
very brief (e.g., a couple of seconds), would such contacts
still be detected? What is the minimum duration of a contact
that will be reliably detected? Will smartphones be able to
detect the type and proximity of the contact? For example,
were the two subjects within 1.5 meters of each other or
at less than 0.1 meters? Did they touch each other? The
answers to these questions in the context of smartphone-based
contact tracing is not clear. Nevertheless, both among medical
professionals, and even software developers (who might not
have the relevant background in communications technology
and computer hardware to appreciate the neighbor discovery
process in smartphones), contact tracing apps are now being
seen as the holy grail for this problem. However, what a
contact tracing app might or might not be able to do will
be fundamentally limited by the underlying hardware and
protocol configuration of ND mechanisms supported by the
smartphone device.
Besides the success probability of the ND procedure itself,
the distance estimation is highly susceptible to errors. This
estimation is based on sensing the attenuation of the wireless
signal, which in free space correlates with the distance
between two devices. However, human tissue attenuates these
signals much more, which can make distance estimations to
be erroneous. Therefore, the accuracy of distance estimation
will depend on the particular positioning of the devices
detecting each other, e.g., are they in one’s hands, in the
pocket, or in a bag? The accuracy will also depend on
the relative orientation of the people carrying the phones.
In addition, there are different other sources of error, e.g.,
variations among devices, signal reflexions in the environment
and frequency-dependent receiver sensitivities. As a result,
contacts that are not relevant could be misclassified as
relevant, (viz., result in false positives), and actually relevant
contacts might not be registered. Since both testing (for
SARS-CoV-2) and isolation are expensive, there is a strong
need to avoid too many false positives, which would lead to
testing and/or isolating a large number of uninfected people.
Hence, a sufficient “safety margin” needs to be built into the
distance estimation procedure, which in turn will lead to a
higher rate of unregistered relevant contacts.
Contributions of This Paper: In this paper, we attempt
to address the above questions. We systematically evaluate
the suitability of ND configurations in commercially-available
smartphones for the purpose of electronic contact tracing. Our
study exposes the fundamental limits that any smartphone
will have, no matter which contact tracing app is used. We
show that distance estimation can only be done with limited
accuracy. We also discuss issues related to how a smartphone
should be used for effective contact tracing. From this we con-
clude that for many users – especially susceptible population
groups, such as the elderly, who may not be comfortable with
technology – a smartphone-based solution will be of limited
value.
We finally argue that for “gapless” contact tracing, smart-
phones are not suitable. Results from disease spread models
(e.g., [5]) show that contact tracing using smartphones can
considerably reduce the reproduction rate R, even with partial
adoption of contact tracing apps. Our study – on the reliability
of the ND process in smartphones – when combined with
such disease spread models would result in a more accurate
estimation of the necessary adoption rates in order to achieve
the desired containment. It can also quantify how improving
the reliability of tracing mechanisms (cf. smartphone-based
ones) would lead to a better decline of a spread.
For example, the models in [5] indicate that even when
the delay between patients developing symptoms until their
identification and isolation is only one day, the success proba-
bility for contact tracing needs to exceed at least 60 % (for the
lowest estimate of the basic reproduction number R0 in [5])
in order to contain a spread. Given that contacts cannot be
recorded with 100 % reliability using smartphones (as we
show in this paper), the adoption of contact tracing apps has
to be considerably larger than 60 % to contain the spread
(i.e., to ensure that R < 1). Given that high adoption rates
appear to be unrealistic (only a very small fraction of the
population has adopted such apps, including in countries like
Singapore, where the adoption rates were expected to be much
higher), smartphone-based contact tracing would have to be
augmented by additional social distancing measures, which are
associated with their own challenges. Alternatively, we need
more reliable tracing mechanisms compared to what currently-
available smartphones would be able to facilitate.
Driven by this insight that detection reliability is a critical
variable, we propose a wearable solution for contact tracing,
such as an electronic bracelet. We discuss its design and
advantages and argue that a wearable solution can potentially
mitigate all the major limitations that smartphones suffer
from. While such dedicated wearable solutions are yet to be
developed and tested in practice, they seem to be a promising
alternative to smartphone-based contact tracing.
In addition, from our performance evaluation also follows
which parameterizations offered by Android should be used
for contact tracing apps. To the best of our knowledge, no
prior data on which of the available setting performs best
for this purpose has been known. Therefore, our results can
be directly used for improving the performance of contact
tracing apps.
Summary and Organization: In summary, our main contri-
butions are as follows. (a) We debunk the potential impression
that smartphones can reliably conduct contact tracing and
the only obstacle is their adoption (stemming from issues
such as privacy and security). (b) Towards this, we lay the
foundations for quantifying the reliability and accuracy of
contact tracing when using currently-available smartphones.
These, when combined with available epidemic spread models,
can lead to a better estimation of adoption rates necessary for
containment, and the required speed with which potentially
infected people should be tested and isolated. (c) We show why
the limited reliability of any smartphone-based contact tracing
app, and its other shortcomings, can be addressed using an
alternative wearable solution, such as an electronic bracelet.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we briefly describe the theoretical foundations of
energy- and latency-optimal solutions for contact tracing. In
Section III, the performance of contact tracing using currently-
available iOS and Android smartphones is evaluated. In
Section IV, we propose a wearable solution for gapless
contact tracing, which could overcome the shortcomings of
smartphone-based approaches. In Section V we conclude that
smartphone-based tracing solutions, while technically feasible,
do not allow reliable detection and classification of all con-
tacts.
II. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY
As discussed in the previous section, the mechanism un-
derlying wireless contact tracing is called neighbor discovery
(ND). In this section, we briefly describe the ND procedure
and its performance in general. The goal of this section is to
illustrate the design space of ND protocols, which involves
multiple trade-offs, e.g., latency versus energy consumption
versus resilience in crowded situations. Any smartphone ap-
plication for contact tracing will build on a restricted version
of this procedure. We study such restrictions and evaluate the
resulting performance in Section III.
Let us first consider two wireless devices that are unaware
of their mutual presence, but would like to “discover” each
other as soon as they are in close proximity. One of them acts
as a sender and the other as a receiver. The sender continually
broadcasts beacons, while the receiver continually listens
to the channel for certain time intervals. All transmissions
and receptions are scheduled following a certain pattern that
repeats itself after a certain time. The receiver has discovered
the sender, once a beacon is sent within a reception window
of the receiver.
The main reason behind both transmission and listening
being continual and not continuous is energy. There is an
energy cost for both sending a beacon and for listening to
the channel. Another reason, which might hold for some
devices, is the parallel execution of other tasks. For example,
the receiver might communicate with a third device when
not listening for incoming beacons. When not sending or
receiving, the devices go to a sleep or power-down mode in
order to save energy. Since smartphones are battery-powered,
saving energy to ensure that the phone does not have to
be charged too often is of crucial importance and greatly
affects its usability. From the perspective of ND, the energy
consumption of each device is determined by the fraction of
time spent on transmission or reception, i.e., by the duty-cycle
for transmission β and for reception γ. For a ND protocol to
be efficient the goal is to identify a transmission and reception
pattern that, for a given tuple (β, γ), minimizes the time until a
beacon is guaranteed to overlap with a reception window in the
worst case. In other words, given transmission and reception
energy budgets, which transmission and reception patterns will
minimize the worst-case discovery latency?
Clearly, in the context of contact tracing, the neighbor
discovery procedure should guarantee discovery within a short
time interval, i.e., it should be able to register contacts even
when two people come in close proximity for relatively short
intervals of time, e.g., when shopping at a grocery store, or
jogging at a park. However, being able to do so should not
quickly drain the battery of the device. While ND protocols
have been routinely used in a variety of devices, ranging from
phones, to laptops, speakers and keyboards, it is only very
recently that we have a good understanding of how to exactly
determine optimal beacon transmission and reception patterns.
In particular, what is the lowest discovery latency L that any
receiver with a duty-cycle of γ and any sender with a duty-
cycle of β can achieve was determined in [13] and is as
follows.
L =
⌈
1
γ
⌉
· ω
β
+ ω (1)
where ω is the transmission duration of a beacon. For example,
if we require that only contacts that last for at least 5 seconds
are relevant for disease transmission and need to be registered,
then L = 5 s. In order to realize this with a beacon length of
ω = 40 µs, both devices need to be active for about β = γ =
0.28 % of their time.
Using which transmission and reception patterns can this
performance be achieved? The only known patterns of beacon
transmission and reception that achieve optimal discovery
latencies are based on periodic intervals [10], [12]. They
work as follows. One device periodically broadcasts beacons
with a period Ta, whereas the other device switches on its
receiver for a window of ds time-units after every Ts time-
units. This scheme – with some minor modifications that we
describe below – is used by BLE protocols implemented inside
smartphones.
Recall that for one sender and one receiver, the optimal
discovery latency for a given energy-budget is known (cf.
Equation 1), and this latency guaranteed in 100 % of all
discovery attempts. But the moment both devices act as both
senders and receivers, the probability of discovery within the
same time interval L now drops. With additional devices being
within the range of reception, this probability drops even
further. Why is this so, is explained below.
Consider two devices A and B, each of which both receives
and also transmits. Since they will both run the same firmware
or software, both will have the same values of the tuple
(Ta, Ts, ds). Since Ta, Ts and ds are designed such that a
beacon of one device should overlap with a reception window
of another device, and since the tuple (Ta, Ts, ds) is identical
on both the devices, a beacon of e.g., device A will also overlap
with a reception window of A once every worst-case latency L.
However, the radio cannot receive and transmit simultaneously
at the same time. Hence, the affected reception window needs
to be interrupted by one beacon transmission duration ω plus
the time needed by the radio to switch between reception and
transmission and vice-versa. Now if B transmits a beacon that
overlaps with this affected reception window of A, it might
not be received, since A is transmitting or switching between
reception and transmission and therefore not listening to the
channel.
Besides the beacon transmission rate, which we describe
below, the probability of this failure also depends on the
length and hence the transmission duration of a beacon. The
more bytes per beacon are transmitted, the higher will be
the probability of failed discoveries. The minimal data to be
exchanged by two contact tracing devices in range is a device
identifier. To be able to provide at least one unique ID for
each device, 4 byte or more are required. In addition, for
detecting an incoming beacon, a preamble of at least 1 byte
needs to be added for technical reasons on most radios. We
hence assume that a 5 byte-packet needs to be transmitted for
contact tracing. For a pair of devices, existing near-optimal
approaches [10] can guarantee a worst-case latency of 5 s in
around 99.98 % of cases (in contrast to 100 % when there is
only one sender and one receiver), with an energy consumption
close to the theoretical optimum. However, as soon as the
number of devices increases, this success probability will be
reduced even further, as we describe next.
1) ND in Crowded Scenarios: While the success rate is
99.98 % when only two devices are in close proximity, this
rate rapidly drops for a larger number of devices (cf. [10]
for a study on this). The mechanism that causes this drop is
multiple devices sending beacons at the same point in time.
Such overlapping beacons collide and fail to be received. The
fact that any two consecutive beacons are spaced by Ta time-
units intensifies this problem, since if one pair of beacons from
two devices collide, all other pairs of the same device pair will
also collide.
There are multiple situations that are of potential relevance
for virus transmission, in which a larger number of people
are in vicinity of each other. For example, consider a crowed
public bus or even a ski gondola. As a worst-case scenario, the
maximum density of crowds without squashing and tilting the
human body has been estimated to be 6 persons/m2 [19]. The
German government considers contacts within a transmission
distance of 1.5 m as relevant. If we assume that a radio
will have a range of 2 m for safely covering the required
distance of 1.5 m, the worst-case number of people/phones
in a collision domain is 75. Hence, using known approaches
for realizing L using Equation 1, e.g., [10], about 35 %
of all discovery attempts will fail. This implies that a
significant number of contacts will not be registered. Clearly,
countermeasures need to be taken, which trade energy
consumption or discovery latency against success probability.
In other words, if some increase in the worst-case latency L
(again, which is only reached in 100 % of all cases for only
one sender and one receiver) is tolerated, then the success
probability when multiple devices need to discover each other
can be increased. In particular, the following two techniques
can be used for making neighbor discovery protocols more
robust against collisions. Both of them are currently used in
smartphones.
Reducing the Channel Utilization: The probability of colli-
sions is given by the fraction of time each device utilizes the
channel, i.e., β. Hence, if fewer beacons are sent at any point in
time, then the collision probability decreases. As a drawback,
since beacons are then sent less frequently, the worst-case
latency L will increase, or the duty-cycle for reception γ
needs to be increased for compensating for the reduced β
(see Equation 1). Reducing β and in turn increasing γ for
reaching the same L will, however, increase the overall energy
consumption. In practice, when Ta is increased to reduce
collisions, ds needs to be increased for reaching the same
worst-case latency, such that the overall energy consumption
of every device is increased.
For example, when choosing a reduced channel-utilization
of β′ = 1/4 · β and an increased duty-cycle for reception of
γ′ = 4 · γ, the failure probability for the protocol described
above when simultaneously discovering 75 devices can be
reduced from 35 % to about 10 % without increasing L. On
a radio in which transmission consumes the same current as
reception, the lowest worst-case latency for a given energy
budget η = β + γ is achieved for β = γ = 1/2(β + γ) [13].
Reducing the channel utilization to β′ while increasing γ to γ′
will hence lead to an increased sum η′ = β′ +γ′ = 17/8 ·η and
therefore to an increased energy consumption, while leading
to the same L. As we will show in Section III, smartphones
use a very low channel utilization β, thereby achieving low
collision rates at the expense of increased energy consumption.
Decorrelation: A technique used by the BLE protocol, which
is used in smartphones, is decorrelation. It will further increase
the worst-case latency L, but reduces the chance of multiple
subsequent colliding beacons.
Instead of sending beacons with periodic intervals, two
consecutive beacons can be separated by a fixed amount
of time plus a certain random component. For nevertheless
guaranteeing the same worst-case latency L, the reception
duty-cycle γ needs to be increased. Consider for example a
configuration where Ta = ds−ω, which has been shown to be
a configuration that reaches the smallest possible worst-case
latency [13]. Here, a beacon will coincide with every scan
window, since the distance between two consecutive beacons
does not exceed the length of a reception window. If now Ta
is additionally increased by a random component ρ ∈ [0, b],
ds needs to be extended by b time-units for ensuring that
a beacon will still fall into every scan window. Otherwise,
another beacon has to overlap with a later scan window for
realizing discovery, thereby increasing the worst-case latency
L. As a result, the collision rate will only slightly reduce
(since the effective distance between two successive beacons
is increased to Ta plus the mean value of b, which leads to a
reduced channel utilization β), but the collision probabilities of
the individual beacons become decorrelated from each other.
In other words, if one pair of beacons from two different
devices collide, a later pair of beacons only collides with a
probability below 1. If now multiple beacons overlap with one
or more scan windows of a remote device, there is an increased
chance that one of them will not collide and hence, the success
probability increases. For strategies based on decorrelation and
multiple overlapping beacons, configurations that optimize the
trade-off between failure probability, discovery latency and
energy have not yet been sufficiently studied in the literature
and remain unknown.
In summary, there are multiple degrees of freedom for
optimizing the ND procedure, and identifying the optimal
trade-off between discovery latency, energy consumption and
success probability is crucial for efficient and reliable contact
tracing. Unfortunately, on a smartphone, these degrees of
freedom are not exposed to a contact tracing app and several
protocol parameters are already predetermined. In light of
this, we examine the performance that is achievable using
smartphones in the next section.
III. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY ON SMARTPHONES
In the previous section, we have described the degrees
of freedom when designing ND protocols in general. The
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol used for contact tracing
on smartphones restricts these degrees of freedom, and the
Android and iOS operating systems further impose restrictions
on the BLE operation. In this section, we first describe these
restrictions that limit the design space when BLE is used,
and then elaborate on the additional restrictions imposed by
Android and iOS. We then study the performance achieved
under these restrictions and evaluate whether it is sufficient for
reliable contact tracing. Our goals are i) assessing the tracing
performance on existing smartphones, ii) identifying the most
suitable parameterizations on smartphones, and iii) showing
how a dedicated device (e.g., a wearable) could exploit the
availability of the entire design space for improving contact
tracing performance.
A. Restrictions in Smartphones
1) Bluetooth Low Energy: In BLE, so-called advertising
events, within which beacons are sent, are scheduled with
a period of Ta [16]. Reception windows of length ds are
repeated with a period of Ts. Hence, it shares similarities with
the neighbor discovery protocol described above. However,
Ta is composed of a static part Ta,0 plus a random delay of
ρ ∈ [0, 10 ms]. Each advertising event consists of a sequence
of three beacons. Each of them is sent on a dedicated wireless
channel, and these three channels are the same for all devices
and advertising events. Optionally, some of these beacons can
be omitted in every event, such that e.g., only one channel
is used. In this paper we assume that all three channels are
used, since this miminizes the discovery latency and is also the
only option supported by smartphones. The receiver toggles
between the three different channels after each instance of Ts.
While the values of Ta,0, Ts and ds can be chosen freely within
a large, quasi-continuous range, the random delay cannot be
optimized, since its maximum value is fixed. The 3-channel
procedure increases the duty-cycle for transmission β by a
factor of 3 (since 3 beacons are sent every Ta time-units),
and this increased duty-cycle leads to essentially the same
discovery latency as the original one. However, it makes the
discovery more robust compared to when a subset of these
three channels is used. Finally, the minimal beacon length
when broadcasting BLE beacons is 16 byte, because the BLE
protocol requires multiple packet overheads. In particular,
3 byte are used for a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and
4 byte are used as a device identifier. The remaining overhead
bytes are of no additional use for contact tracing. This further
increases the energy consumption for transmission by a factor
of 2-3× compared to the protocol we described in the previous
section.
In summary, compared to an energy-optimal protocol, BLE
introduces an overhead of a factor of approximately 6× to
the energy spent for transmission. An additional overhead
to γ is caused by the random delay ρ, since ds needs to
be increased for guaranteeing the same worst-case latency.
The range of the random delay is fixed. However, no or a
very small range of possible random delays would probably
perform best for a pair of devices, where collisions play a
negligible role, while larger delays than specified in BLE
might further improve the reliability in crowded scenarios
Mode Ta,0 ds Ts
ADVERTISE MODE LOW LATENCY 100 - -
ADVERTISE MODE BALANCED 250 - -
ADVERTISE MODE LOW POWER 1000 - -
SCAN MODE LOW POWER - 512 5120
SCAN MODE BALANCED - 1024 4096
SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY - 4096 4096
TABLE I: Parameter settings supported by Android in [ms].
where multiple phones are present and send beacons. On the
other hand, some of these overheads improve the reliability
of the discovery procedure. In particular, the random delay
increases the success probability in crowded scenarios. The
CRC allows detecting beacons that collided because of concur-
rent transmissions from multiple devices, which improves the
accuracy of distance estimation (which we describe later). The
operation on three channels might allow for a later successful
discovery when there is interference from non-BLE devices
on one of these channels.
2) Android and iOS: We have already discussed how BLE
constraints the designs space of the ND procedure. While BLE
allows essentially any configuration for the tuple (Ta,0, Ts, ds),
Android constrains the design space to 3 different settings that
affect (Ts, ds). In addition, Android provides a batch mode,
where multiple discovered devices are reported jointly with a
certain delay. This mode might allow for 3 additional configu-
rations of (Ts, ds). We do not consider these configurations in
this paper, since we could not find a complete documentation
covering this feature. In addition to the settings for scanning,
Android provides another 3 different settings that affect Ta,0.
On a smartphone, fixed values for these parameters are not
feasible, because the smartphone hardware might be forced to
vary them during runtime. First, the Bluetooth system-on-a-
chip (SoC) might need to carry out advertising and scanning
in parallel to other tasks, e.g., streaming audio to a wireless
headphone. As a result, the points in time when both tasks
need to be served might overlap. Since the device can carry
out only one task at a time, some scheduling is needed to
resolve this conflict, which might require adapting the values
of Ta, Ts and ds online. In other words, the effective values
of Ta, Ts and ds that are used would be different from the
ones that were provided by the operating system’s API and
were chosen by a contact tracing application. In addition,
many smartphones share certain hardware components, e.g.,
the radio and/or the antenna, for realizing different wireless
Fig. 1: Sequence of beacons (red arrows) with Ta ≤ ds that
falls with an offset of Φ into the scan interval Ts, which
separates two scan windows (S) from each other.
protocols. The SoC or antenna that is responsible for BLE
might also be used for WiFi-communication. For example,
the Samsung Galaxy S10 smartphone uses the same SoC for
IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) and Bluetooth [22]. However, it is not
possible to e.g., transmit a WiFi frame and a BLE beacon
at the same time. Indeed, SoCs that combine BLE and WiFi
use arbitration mechanisms for this purpose [20]. The exact
method using which such conflicts are resolved in a certain
smartphone model is, to the best of our knowledge, not
known, since no generic documentation is available on this.
It depends on the particular SoC used and hence potentially
varies between different smartphone models. In general, there
are two possibilities for resolving such scheduling conflicts.
First, the parameters Ta,0, Ts and ds could be chosen such
that no advertising packet or scan window overlaps with any
other task. Second, if this is not possible, an advertising packet
could be skipped, sent earlier/later, or the parameters Ta,0, Ts
and ds might be altered repeatedly on a short-term basis.
The values of Ta, Ts and ds used in Android smartphones
are not specified in the official documentation – the reason
for this might lie in the potential need for short-term changes
described above. However, Android is an open source soft-
ware, and information that is not provided in its specification
documents can be looked up directly from the source code.
The Android source code contains different tuples of values
(Ta,0, Ts, ds), which are summarized in Table I. A pair of
values for Ts and ds can be selected by an application by
choosing one of the SCAN MODE settings, whereas the
value of Ta,0 can be selected by using one of the ADVER-
TISE MODE settings.
We could experimentally observe that the Ta,0-values given
in Table I are used in smartphones in practice. However,
especially in the presence of other Bluetooth tasks running
in parallel (e.g., streaming audio to a wireless headphone),
the actual values might change in an unpredictable manner.
The same holds true for Ts and ds. In addition, different
smartphone manufactures might use other values than those
from Table I in their adapted Android versions. Furthermore,
they might change in future versions of Android. Indeed, dif-
ferent values for Android are known from previously published
work [21], indicating that they have been changed in the past.
For iOS, no parameterizations that are being used are
documented. Since iOS is a closed source software, we also
cannot obtain them from the source code. However, Apple
recommends certain values of Ta,0 for gadgets communicating
with iOS devices in [3]. We therefore assume that iOS devices
themselves will also use them, as long as there are no schedul-
ing conflicts. In particular, the following advertising intervals
Ta,0 are recommended for iOS, while no data are given for Ts
and ds: 152.5 ms, 211.25 ms, 318.75 ms, 417.5 ms, 546.25 ms,
760 ms, 852.5 ms, 1022.5 ms, 1285.0 ms.
In summary, while there are no guaranteed parameter values
used by ND protocols on smartphones, we can assume that
the ones we have described above are used in most cases,
e.g., when no other Bluetooth communication takes place in
parallel. In the next section, we evaluate the energy con-
sumption, discovery latency, and success probabilities that can
be expected from these values. We also discuss whether the
resulting performance is acceptable for contact tracing.
B. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance that can be
achieved under the constraints of BLE on Android. We thereby
assume that the values from Table I for Android and the values
of Ta,0 we have described for iOS are used. As we have
explained above, these values might change due to various
reasons. We will therefore also discuss how such variations
might impact the performance. Since there are multiple other
uncertainties, e.g., different BLE SoCs used on different smart-
phones, and the lack of specifications, we thereby estimate the
expected bandwidth of performance whenever appropriate.
In all our evaluations, we assume a packet length of 16 byte,
which is the minimal length supported by the BLE standard.
This already comprises the length of a MAC address that could
be used as a device ID for contact tracing. If additional data
are to be sent on top (e.g., a random ID in addition to the
MAC address), the packet length is increased, which impacts
the energy consumption and collision probability, but not the
discovery latency.
1) Discovery Latency: We now study the discovery latency
achieved a) by two Android phones discovering each other,
and b) by an Android phone discovering an iOS phone. The
situation in which an iOS device discovers an Android phone
cannot be evaluated, since no data on Ts and ds used by iOS
are available.
Let us have a closer look on the values from Table I
and the Ta,0-values we have outlined for iOS. Most of them
fulfill Ta < ds. This situation is illustrated by Figure 1.
After two devices come within their reception range, the first
advertising beacon of one device coincides with an arbitrary
instance of the scan interval Ts of the other device with
an offset of Φ time-units. Φ is a random value between 0
and Ts. Since Ta < ds, the latency measured from the first
beacon to the successfully received one is limited by roughly
Ts − ds time-units. Because both devices might have been
brought into range by up to Ta+10 ms before the first beacon
was sent, the worst-case latency is bounded by approximately
Ts− ds + Ta,0 + 10 ms (cf. Figure 1). As an example, for the
SCAN MODE LOW POWER setting and a value of Ta,0 =
100 ms, the worst-case latency is approximately 4718 ms.
On the other hand, for some other settings, e.g.,
ADVERTISE MODE LOW POWER in combination with
SCAN MODE LOW POWER, Ta > ds. Here, the first scan
window might be missed in some cases, and only a later
scan window can lead to a successful discovery. For such
parameterizations, the latencies might be finite or infinite,
depending on Ta,0, Ts and ds (see [11] for details). In any
case, since Ts always exceeds 4 s in all scanning settings
on Android, and since discovery can only be guaranteed
after multiple instances of Ts, the resulting latencies are
significantly larger than for parameterizations with Ta < ds.
In contrast, in the SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY setting,
the device scans continuously, with only short interruptions
for changing the channel. Hence, discovery is successful
within Ta,0 + 10 ms time-units, since every beacon is re-
ceived almost instantaneously. For example, for the AD-
VERTISE MODE LOW LATENCY setting, the worst-case
latency would be 110 ms.
For the simplicity of exposition, in the following, we
consider the discovery latency measured from the first beacon
sent after two devices have been brought within range. Since
the first beacon might have been sent by up to Ta time-units
after this, the worst-case latency observed in practice is by Ta
time-units larger. Figure 2a depicts the simulated discovery
latencies when the SCAN MODE LOW POWER setting is
used, which translates to Ts = 5120 ms and ds = 512 ms.
Similarly, Figure 2b depicts the discovery latency for the
SCAN MODE BALENCED setting (Ts = 4096 ms, ds =
1024 ms). We have considered all values of Ta,0 supported by
BLE in the depicted range. For every value of Ta,0, we have
carried out 1, 000 simulations. For each of them, we have
computed the maximum latency and the mean latency. The
solid red vertical lines depict the values of Ta,0 supported by
Android, and the dashed lines correspond to those supported
by iOS.
Let us first consider the SCAN MODE LOW POWER
setting. As can be seen, for values with Ta < ds, the maximum
latency is approximately 5 s. However, for Ta > ds, some
parameterizations lead to high maximum and mean latencies.
For example, for Ta,0 = 1022.5 ms, which is supported by
Android, the maximum resulting latency is 172.5 s. For the
purpose of contact tracing, such a latency could be unaccept-
able, since a close contact of less than 3 minutes could already
be relevant for a virus transmission. Recall from our previous
discussion that because of issues such as resource sharing,
smartphones might also deviate from the given parameter
values. For example, if, due to scheduling conflicts, the value
of Ta,0 = 1022.5 ms would be slightly reduced to 1018.8 ms,
the discovery latency would converge towards infinity (cf.
Figure 2a), and the devices would therefore never discover
each other in most cases. Also for the parameterizations with
Ta < 512 ms, there are no guarantees that the depicted latency
is always reached. For example, for Ta,0 = 417.5 ms, when
assuming that every second beacon was dropped, the effective
interval would be increased to 835 ms, leading to latencies
of around L = 30 s. For the SCAN MODE BALANCED
setting, the overall situation looks similar (cf. Figure 2b),
but a larger fraction of the values for Ta,0 lead to latencies
blow 5 s. In summary, many of the supported configurations
provide practical latencies of up to ∼ 5 s, while there are also
combinations of parameters that might lead to latencies being
unacceptable for contact tracing. Therefore, the settings should
be chosen carefully.
In addition, as already explained, the parameter values
that actually get used can not be controlled entirely by the
application, especially when different tasks utilize the radio
in parallel, which is the case in smartphones. Hence, in some
cases, the actual latencies might differ from the ones presented
(a) SCAN MODE LOW POWER (b) SCAN MODE BALANCED
Fig. 2: Simulation of maximum and mean discovery latencies in Android for different values of Ta,0. The vertical lines depict
values of Ta,0 used by Android (solid lines) and iOS (dashed lines).
above. As a result, we have to consider a smartphone as a
device that maintains a certain maximum discovery latency in
most cases, while no guarantees can be given for the worst
case. Finally, different smartphone manufacturers might have
altered these values in their adopted versions of Android, or
might do this in the future. Therefore, compatibility among all
different smartphone models – for the purpose of estimating
a worst-case discovery latency – is also not guaranteed.
Scan Mode nRF52832 BLE112
LOW POWER 0.52− 0.57 % 2.13− 2.34 %
BALANCED 1.30− 1.35 % 5.30− 5.51 %
LOW LATENCY 5.20− 5.25 % 21.14− 21.35 %
TABLE II: Reduction of the battery runtime by continuous
contact tracing using different Android scan modes. Each
given range of percentages accounts for all values of Ta,0
supported by Android and iOS.
2) Energy Consumption: We now study how the settings
from Table I impact the energy consumption in the case of
Android phones. We have computed the mean current draw
IBLE of a BLE radio that scans and advertises according to
the different settings.
Different smartphones use different radios with different
firmware and, accordingly, have different energy consumption.
We computed the energy consumption for two SoCs with
published energy data. But we did not see any smartphone
using these chips. Smartphones typically use dual-mode chips
that support WiFi and Bluetooth, for which, to the best of
our knowledge, no data are available. For all recent devices
we have investigated, these data appear to be confidential.
Therefore, we study two different, well-chosen Bluetooth ra-
dios, and we assume that the energy consumption of the SoCs
used on smartphones lie in between the energy consumption of
our two chosen SoCs. First, we consider a Bluegiga BLE112
wireless module. This radio is based on the Texas Instruments
CC2540 SoC, which was among the first BLE radios available.
In addition, we consider the more recent Nordic nRF52832
SoC.
The estimation for the BLE112 device has been carried
out based on the energy model proposed in [14]. We have
thereby followed the recommendation in [14] to model an
advertising event (i.e., a sequence of packets on different
channels used for advertising) as an event of a BLE master
in the connected mode. We have assumed that the advertiser
does not listen for responses to its advertising packets, thereby
simpifying the model from [14]. We have further assumed that
two consecutive packets within one event on the same channel
are separated from each other by 150 µs. The impact of these
assumptions on the energy consumption is negligible.
For the nRF52832 SoC, we have applied the energy model
provided by the device manufacturer for advertising in [18].
For scanning, no dedicated model is available. We therefore
have assumed the reception current given in its datasheet [17]
for estimating the energy consumption during a scan window
of length ds. For accounting for the switching overheads (i.e.,
the energy needed for activating and deactivating the radio
before and after a scan window), we have artificially extended
ds by 2 × 140 µs, which is equal to 2 ramp-up times of
the radio. For both SoCs, we have assumed an operating
Voltage of 3 V and a transmit power of 0 dBm. Further, we
have neglected the sleep current, which is small against the
current draw during communication. From this data, we have
computed the average current draw IBLE of the BLE SoC
during contact tracing.
We have put IBLE in relation to the mean current draw
of the smartphone. For this purpose, we have assumed that a
smartphone is equipped with a battery capacity of 3000 mAh.
We have further assumed that this capacity is drained within
24 h when contact tracing is not carried out, which leads to
an average current consumption of IP = 3000mAh/24 h of the
smartphone. We can now form the fraction IBLE/IP , which
gives us the percentage of time by which continuous contact
tracing will drain the battery earlier.
Table II depicts the results of this computation. The
given range of values for each scan setting comprises all
different advertising intervals Ta,0 supported by Android
and iOS. The impact of the advertising interval Ta,0 is
negligible, whereas the scan setting (which relates to Ts
and ds) has a huge impact on the energy consumption. For
the BLE112 radio, the SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY
setting reduces the battery lifetime by about 20 %, which will
be noticable in practice. The SCAN MODE BALANCED
setting reduces the battery lifetime by about 5 %, and
the SCAN MODE LOW POWER by about 3 %. For
the nRF51822 radio, the energy consumption is by
approximately 75 % lower in all modes of operation.
We can conclude that the SCAN MODE BALANCED
and the SCAN MODE LOW POWER settings come
with a sufficiently low energy-overhead, while the
SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY can potentially reduce
the battery runtime by a noticeable degree on some
smartphone models.
It needs to be mentioned that compared to a ND solution
with optimal energy efficiency (cf. [13]), the parameterizations
supported by Android and iOS require significantly more
energy for providing the same worst-case latency. In particular,
the partitioning of the overall duty-cycle β + γ into reception
and transmission is far from the optimum, since here, γ >> β,
whereas β ≈ γ leads to the best trade-off between energy and
latency. Clearly, ds could be significantly reduced for many of
the supported choices of Ta,0, thereby guaranteeing the same
latency with lower energy consumption. However, the overall
energy demand of the Bluetooth radio is small compared to the
capacity of batteries in most currently available smartphones.
As a result, the energy-demanding configurations are of no
significant consequence for the battery runtime. In addition,
many of these parameterizations lead to multiple beacon
transmissions per scan window, which improves the resilience
against collisions. We next study this issue of resilience. On
the other hand, a dedicated device for contact tracing could
achieve significantly higher battery lifetimes of up to 6 months,
as we describe in Section IV.
3) Collision Behavior: If two or more devices transmit a
beacon at the same time, these beacons will overlap and hence
collide. With high probability, these beacons will then not be
received successfully, even when they coincide with a scan
window. This might increase the discovery latency, or even
prevent discovery in some cases. Note that the 3-channel-
operation of BLE does not mitigate this problem, since if a pair
of beacons from two devices overlaps on the same channel,
the remaining two beacon pairs on the other channels will also
overlap.
The choice of Ta,0 also impacts the collision rate, since
it affects the fraction of time β during which the chan-
nel is busy. Recall that in a pessimistic contact tracing
scenario, up to 75 people can come into spatial vicinity.
To cover the absolute worst case, we consider that the
range of the radio will exceed the one actually required
for contact tracing. Hence, we assume that up to 100 de-
vices can interfere with each other. We have simulated
10, 000 discovery procedures for each parameterization. We
have considered a discovery procedure as successful, if at
least one non-colliding beacon overlapped with a scan win-
dow within 10 s. For the SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY
and SCAN MODE BALANCED settings, assuming that ev-
ery smartphone uses the same settings, the resulting suc-
cess probability was 100 % for all values of Ta,0 sup-
ported by Android and iOS, barring one exception for
SCAN MODE BALANCED with Ta,0 = 1.285 s, where the
success probability was reduced to 96.4 %. Figure 3 depicts the
probabilities for the SCAN MODE LOW POWER setting.
As can be seen, the probabilities vary between 99.4 % and
39.1 %. Hence, for some values of Ta,0, almost all discovery
attempts are successful within 10 s, whereas for others, more
than ∼ 60 % exceed 10 s. For values of Ta,0 > 512 ms, the
low success probability is caused both by colliding beacons
and by the worst-case latency exceeding 10 ms.
The reasons for the high success probability for most
parameterizations are a) the relatively low channel utilization
β = ω/Ta,0 of each radio, and b) the large scan window ds in
combination with the random delay. Since multiple beacons
are sent within every scan window, the probability that one
of them is received without overlapping with a beacon from a
different device is high.
4) Summary: In summary, the
SCAN MODE BALANCED setting results in discovery
within reasonable latencies. It is compatible with almost all
advertising intervals supported by Android and iOS, does not
drain the battery overly quickly, and also works in crowded
scenarios. The SCAN MODE LOW POWER setting can
potentially lead to impractically high latencies and failure
rates, while the SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY setting
comes with an unnecessarily high energy consumption.
For the advertising interval Ta,0, we recommend to
use the ADVERTISE MODE LOW LATENCY or
ADVERTISE MODE BALANCED settings, since this
choice does not have a major impact on the energy
consumption, but leads to low latencies.
From a neighbor discovery and energy (or battery life)
perspective, contact tracing using smartphones appears to
be feasible. However, it needs to be highlighted that there
is no guarantee that a performance or reliability is always
reached, and there is always a risk that certain contacts remain
unrecorded. In addition, different phones and apps, e.g., iOS
Fig. 3: Probabiltiy of discovery in a crowd of 100 subjects for
the SCAN MODE LOW POWER setting.
and Android devices, might use different parameter values,
such that some smartphones can discover each other faster
and with higher resilience against collisions than others. In the
worst case, device manufacturers might have altered the values
currently found in Android, resulting in certain phones might
not being able to discover each other in a reliable manner. In
other words, smartphone-based contact tracing is a best-effort
mechanism without any guarantees. This should be realized by
both individuals using a contact tracing app, and should also
be accounted for by infection spread models that estimate the
minimum adoption rates of contact tracing apps in order to
contain a stread.
As an attempt to facilitate and improve contact tracing on
smartphones, Google and Apple are currently drafting a new
specification [6] for a Bluetooth contact tracing service. This
draft also proposes values for Ta,0. However, applications
building on this new specification can only be used after an
update of the operating system of the phone. Such updates
are infeasible especially for older phone models, where the
manufacturers no longer provide software support. Even when
being deployed in large scale, the lack of guaranteed parameter
values and hence latencies will prevail. In particular, the new
specification [6] clearly states that the advertising interval
might be “subject to change”, while being “reccomended”
to lie between 200 ms and 270 ms. Further, this specification
gives no values for Ts and ds, but states that they need to be
chosen such that a nearby device is detected within 5 minutes.
Besides many contacts below 5 minutes might already be
relevant (e.g., consider two persons jogging in a park or
shaking hands when they meet and then disperse again), this
also limits the granularity of the contact duration estimation to
5 minutes. As a result, such smartphone-based services need
to be considered as a very coarse tool for contact tracing.
So far, we have only discussed aspects related to the
neighbor discovery procedure on smartphones. In the next
section, we will study additional aspects and then refine our
conclusion.
C. Other Limitations
Even though contact tracing on smartphones appears to
be feasible from a neighbor discovery perspective, there are
nevertheless multiple additional limitations that significantly
reduce the performance and reliability of smartphone-based
contact tracing. In particular, the following problems are
inherent to smartphone-based solutions.
1) For contact tracing, it is of fundamental importance
to estimate the distance or proximity between two subjects.
This can either be done by limiting the transmit power, such
that only relevant distances are covered, or by evaluating
the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). In both cases,
the distance estimation is based on the fact that wireless
signals are subjected to a distance-dependent attenuation, and
on the assumption that the distance can be estimated from
the measured attenuation. In this estimation, there are many
sources of errors. For example, the attenuation depends on
the smartphone model, on the orientation of the sending and
Distance Tissue Distance Free Space
20 cm 60 cm
25 cm 1m
32 cm >> 1m1
TABLE III: Distances in human tissue and the corresponding
estimated free-space distance.
receiving antennas, the environment (e.g., metal parts in vicin-
ity) and on the wireless channel used. While some of these
uncertainties can be mitigated through various techniques, the
following problem will always remain.
Whenever the wireless signal has to pass through the human
body, the attenuation is much larger than in free space. For
example, [1] reports an attenuation of 19.2 dB between the
chest and the back of a human body. The exact attenuation is
difficult to to predict, since it depends on the tissue, frequency,
individual subject and the positions of both smartphones on the
human body. However, we in the following roughly estimate
what the difference in attenuation in free space and in the
human body implies for distance estimation.
In [4], the attenuation between a sender and a receiver placed
on different parts of the human body has been measured
experimentally. In some experiments, both devices were in
line of sight, whereas in others, the body was in between them.
Based on the interpolated RSSI values from these experiments,
we exemplify the distances in free space and in tissue that lead
to the same attenuation in Table III. For example, when the
signal has to travel through 32 cm of tissue, a distance of way
more than 1 m would be estimated, since the underlying model
assumes that the attenuation was caused by a certain distance
in free space. Hence, in many situations, the smartphone would
classify a contact person as “far away”, while actually being
close. For example, consider two persons walking side-by
side and holding their hands, but wearing their smartphones
in opposite pockets. Though this would represent a relevant
contact, the obstructed line of sight would lead to a large
estimated distance, an hence to a miss-classification of the
contact. We could further confirm this behavior using our
own experiments: When placing two identical smartphones
on a table in a distance of around 10 cm, when running the
ITO demonstration app for contact tracing [8], the estimated
distance was around 50 cm when both smartphones were
within line of sight. When the arm of a human was placed
between them, the estimated distance increased to almost 5 m.
2) A smartphone might not be carried on the body. For
example, it might be placed in a handbag, or might be left
e.g., in a car, where contacts of the device do not correspond
to actual contacts of the person. This prevents a reliable
reconstruction of contacts, since it will lead to missed contacts
and false positives.
3) For tracing all relevant contacts using a wireless solution,
it is important that as many people as possible participate.
However, not everyone owns a smartphone. For example,
only 81 % of all Germans had a smartphone in 2018 [2].
Fig. 4: Wearable for contact tracing.
Furthermore, a certain part of the population may be physically
or mentally unable to handle a smartphone, e.g., small children
or elderly. Hence, a certain fraction of people will not be able
to participate in smartphone-based contract tracing. As a result,
a certain fraction of relevant contacts remain unnoticed.
4) As mentioned earlier, for contact tracing on smartphones,
an application (app) needs to be installed, Bluetooth permis-
sions need to be granted and the app needs to be activated.
This will always cause handling errors, such that the tracing
application is not always properly activated when people are
in public.
5) As we have already shown, the ND procedure on smart-
phones consumes more energy than necessary. Though the
reduction of the battery lifetime is less than about ∼ 5−25%,
smartphones need to be recharged more frequently and the
total energy demand of all smartphones increases.
6) Though privacy-conserving approaches are being pro-
posed, the high amount of personal data and the various built-
in sensors (e.g., microphones, cameras and GPS) will always
cause privacy-concerns of smartphone users. If the application
exploits its granted permissions, it might forward sensitive data
to a server operated by public authorities.
7) We have shown that the tuples of (Ta,0, Ts, ds) that are
currently supported by recent Android and IoS smartphones
are essentially compatible with each other. However, operating
system developers could change them at any time. In fact,
[21] reports a different value for the scan window ds in the
SCAN MODE BALANCED setting than what is found in the
most recent Android source code. This indicates that it has
been changed recently. As a result, different devices could
become incompatible with each other in the future.
Unfortunately, these issues are fundamental and cannot be
resolved using smartphones. We therefore propose a wearable
solution for contact tracing in the next section.
IV. CONTACT TRACING USING WEARABLES
In this section, we for the first time propose a wearable
solution and outline how it could mitigate the problems
described in the previous section. Consider for example a
wrist-worn bracelet, as depicted in Figure 4. Alternatively, it
could also be worn as a necklace or sticker, as also shown in
the figure. It would consist of simple and low-cost hardware,
e.g., a wireless radio, an accelerometer and a battery. For
example, let us assume the following scenario, in which such
a wearable would be helpful.
In the onset of a pandemic, every person (e.g., in a hospital,
an airplane, a municipality in quarantine or an entire country)
obtains a wearable. While being handed out, it is registered
to the corresponding person. This can be done efficiently
e.g., by swiping a NFC-based passport over the device, or
by simply linking its serial number and owner in a database.
The wearable is always worn in public and detects relevant
contacts. For assessing the relevance of a contact, a score
is computed based on e.g., the contact duration, proximity
and detected activity. Once a person is infected, their device’s
memory is read out and all IDs of devices that have been in
contact throughout the incubation period are identified. The
corresponding persons are then looked up from an external
database. In this scenario, the mapping of IDs and persons
needs to be known to a central authority. In an alternate
solution, the wearables are opportunistically connected to the
Internet through smartphones, using which a list of detected
contacts is uploaded to a server whenever the smartphone is
nearby. Here, the IDs do not need to correspond directly to
persons, since in case of an infection, notifications could be
sent to the smartphones of contact persons without identifying
the smartphone owners. Such a wearable could be designed for
economic manufacturability. Alternatively, an existing wear-
able used for fitness tracking could be re-used, since the
contact tracing functionality can be realized in software.
A wearable solution would mitigate or solve most of
the problems associated with smartphone-based solutions
described in the previous section. In particular, its advantages
are as follows.
Distance Estimation: A bracelet always faces either the
front of the body or its side. Situations in which the arm is in
front of the body can be detected reliably using accelerometer
data and occur regularly [9]. Similarly, a necklace or sticker
is always worn in front of the body. This greatly improves
the reliability of contact detection, especially when detecting
face-to-face contacts, in which droplet infections are more
likely. In addition, techniques such as time-of-flight [15] can
be used. Here, the time within which a signal has traveled
between sender and receiver is used for distance estimation
instead of the attenuation. Though the latest version of the
Bluetooth standard also supports this, there are no compatible
smartphones, yet. Therefore, it is not clear when this will
become available on the majority of smartphones. Finally,
other frequency bands with more beneficial penetration
properties can be used by a wearable. Also collaborative
approaches, where multiple devices jointly estimate their
distances for achieving a higher accuracy, are feasible. With
all of these techniques, the accuracy of distance estimation
could improve considerably, which could lead to a more
reliable tracing.
Adjustable Transmit Power: While smartphones only
provide a few predefined settings, the software on a wearable
has full control over the radio and hence its transmit power.
This means that the range of transmission can be adjusted
to the range needed in the current situation in a fine-grained
manner. This reduces the likelihood of collisions and further
simplifies the distance estimation.
Reliability of Operation: A wearable does not need any
handling, since it is operational whenever it is worn. Hence,
there is no possibility of faulty handling. Since it is designed to
be always worn, the risk that it is left e.g., in a car, is reduced.
Furthermore, since all parameters of the ND procedure can be
optimized, the operation will not be as energy-expensive as
on a smartphone. For example, consider a low-cost nRF52832
radio. According to [18], it consumes 6.7 mA for transmitting
with a power of 0 dBM and 6.7 mA also for receiving or idle-
listening. We conservatively assume that every wake-up comes
with an overhead of 280 µs, during which the full reception or
transmission current is consumed. This overhead corresponds
to 2× the time the radio needs to switch between reception
and transmission, and is hence very conservative.
We further assume that the wearable is equipped with
a 200 mAh battery, which is often found in smartwatches.
For guaranteeing a discovery latency of 5 s, using the
parameterizations from [10], a battery runtime of 76 days
can be achieved. Though some additional measures against
collisions would slightly reduce this runtime, other measures
could drastically extend it. For example, a light-weight
activity detection could switch off the device during sleep or
when not being worn. This could extend the runtime to up
to 6 months, thereby making any recharging of the battery
unnecessary throughout an entire virus outbreak. As a result,
the device would always be operational, which leads to an
improved prevalence of operational tracing devices in the
population. Furthermore, the tuple (Ts, Ta, ds) would always
be compatible with the wearables of all other persons, since
all devices would have the same firmware. Finally, unlike on
smartphones, the parameters actually used would not vary
over time, thereby further improving the tracing reliability.
Privacy: The wearable only contains the hardware needed
for tracing, i.e., a radio and an accelerometer for activity
detection. In addition, it would not store any private data.
Further, it does not maintain a permanent Internet connection.
Hence, it does not record and dispatch any unnecessary
data. This greatly improves the privacy and trustworthiness
compared to a smartphone.
Detection of Physical Contacts: While the distance between
two people is relevant for droplet infections, it could also
be important to detect physical contacts (e.g., two persons
shaking hands) for smear infections. It has been shown
previously that electromagnetic signals can be used to
modulate information over human tissue, e.g., in [7]. Such
a technique could also be used for detecting whether two
persons have touched each other. For example, a bracelet
could both emit and try to detect such signals on the skin.
Once a signal from another device can be detected, there has
been a physical contact.
In summary, a wearable device would solve many of the
problems inherent to smartphone-based tracing solutions and
lead to a much higher tracing reliability. If every person would
wear such a wearable in public, it seems feasible that they
would provide the evidence to inform on when lockdowns are
necessary or can be dispensed with. We therefore believe that
the development of such wearables is an important component
in the toolbox that needs to be developed as a precaution
against the spread of diseases.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied the technical feasibility of
using smartphones for contact tracing. Even though their Blue-
tooth radios support the essential features necessary for contact
tracing, tracing reliability will always be limited, potentially
leading to false positives and/or missed contacts. Indeed it
has been argued that to be effective, delays in notifying
contacts and entry into quarantine should be minimized. Also,
to prevent transmission, robust and reliable contact tracing
apps or devices would need to be used by at least 60 % of the
population [5], even when the reliability of contact detection
is 100 %. Hence, to realize the full potential of wireless
contact tracing, approaches/devices other than smartphones
need to be pursued. As we suggest here, a wearable device
can potentially overcome many of the limitations inherent
to smartphones, thereby allowing for more fine-grained and
reliable tracing, while at the same time reducing many of the
privacy concerns that are currently being discussed. Through
unambiguous identification of only those at risk, the necessity
for mass quarantines would reduce, increasing public benefits
and improving the quality of life during epidemics.
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